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The Strange Career of the Civil Rights
Division's Commitment to Brown
David L. Normant
As we approach the thirtieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Brown v. Board of Education,' I find myself reflecting upon the
United States Department of Justice's response over the years, and the
impact of the Department's actions upon the school desegregation process.
Hindsight helps us to see the shifting nature of that role, and the less
predictable consequences which flow from it. My comments will focus
primarily upon enforcement by the Justice Department during the Nixon
Administration, for it was then that I served as Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in charge of the Civil Rights Division.
I.
I entered the Department of Justice in 1956, directly from law school,
as the most junior attorney in the Department. I began in civil rights. At
that time, federal civil rights law enforcement, such as it was, was directed
by the Criminal Division.2 The Justice Department believed that its only
authority to act lay in a few criminal statutes left over from the Recon-
t A.B., LL.B., University of California at Berkeley. The author, who served in the Justice De-
partment for fifteen years, was the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights from 1971 to 1973,
and was then appointed an Associate Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
An earlier version of this comment was presented at the annual Civil Rights Institute of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., on May 20, 1983.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. The Civil Rights Division was not established until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634. On December 9, 1957, Attorney General Rogers ordered the
creation of a Civil Rights Division. See Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Order No. 155-57.
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struction Era, principally 18 U.S.C. § 242,1 the "police brutality"
statute."
And so, in the early years following Brown, the Justice Department in
general refrained from school desegregation litigation. No serious consid-
eration was given to instituting prosecutions under section 242 against
school officials who had deliberately segregated students. Some members
of the Department thought that the requisite intent to deprive the students
of their constitutional rights was absent, since the doctrine of "separate-
but-equal" had but recently been abandoned and the doctrine of "all de-
liberate speed" had but recently been approved. Others took the more
pragmatic view that, whether segregation violated section 242 or not, the
chances of getting indictments, much less convictions, was zero.5
Whatever we may think about this inaction today, with the benefit of
history and hindsight, the fact is that during the first ten years after
Brown, the federal government had a very limited role in furthering
school desegregation. Its role was pretty much restricted to seeking deseg-
regation in so-called "federal impact" areas, that is, in school districts
which served large numbers of military dependents, 6 and occasionally to
recommending the use of federal marshals and troops to open schoolhouse
doors or to curb the violence connected with school desegregation.7 Even
the Department's participation as an amicus curiae was fairly infrequent.
This is not intended as a criticism. It is simply a recognition of an
historical and sociological fact-in the first decade following Brown, pub-
lic school desegregation moved forward with all deliberate delay.8 Even
3. The statute reads:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects
any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to
different punishments, pains, or penalties, . . . by reason of his color, or race, than are pre-
scribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term
of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945). There is only one reported case in which a public school official was prosecuted under Re-
vised Statute § 5510, the precursor to § 242. See United States v. Buntin, 10 F. 730 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1882).
5. Fresh in the Department's memory was the fact that, after a prolonged and vigorous grand jury
investigation of voting discrimination in numerous parishes in Louisiana, the Justice Department had
been unable to obtain any indictments.
6. See, e.g., 1963 ATr'y GE.N. ANN. REP. 187; 1962 Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 168-70.
7. For example, the Department participated as an amicus in Brown itself and in the Little Rock
desegregation case, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909 (1959), the Department prosecuted several men who sought to
prevent the implementation of a federal court's desegregation order.
8. In 1964, the year in which the Supreme Court finally declared that "[t]he time for mere 'delib-
erate speed' has run out," Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964), less than two
percent of black students in the South were attending integrated schools. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
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private litigants were extremely cautious and selective in their choice of
when and where to commence lawsuits-starting in the early post-Brown
years in those school districts where the probability for some success with
the least amount of violence was highest. Indeed, it would have been ab-
surd to suggest filing suits to desegregate the elementary and secondary
schools of rural Mississippi before James Meredith could successfully be
enrolled at the University of Mississippi.
And so, with minor exceptions, it was not until after the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964' that the Justice Department became active in
public school desegregation litigation. But even this enforcement effort had
a slow beginning. Most of the Civil Rights Division's resources were al-
ready committed to the eradication of voting discrimination in the Deep
South. In addition, the Act itself contained some built-in braking influ-
ences. Title IV contemplated a complaint procedure, involving certifica-
tion by the Attorney General himself in every school desegregation case
filed by the Department.1 Further, it provided no guidelines to aid in
determining when the Attorney General should intervene under Title
IX11 in privately initiated cases. For reasons like this, it was not until
after the voting-rights crisis-the Selma March and the passage and im-
plementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 12-that the school desegre-
gation enforcement effort really got moving.
II.
I see the history of federal implementation of the decision in Brown as
consisting of two rather distinct periods. The 1960's were the era of the
establishment of principles-for example, the rise and fall of freedom of
choice13 and the establishment and spread of Green v. County School
Board's "root-and-branch" approach14 to the removal of racial segrega-
tion in the public schools. Near the end of this era, federal filings of and
interventions in school desegregation suits surged.
The second period, which I call the remedial era, began at about the
RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LErr.R AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW: DESEGREGATION OF THE NATION'S
PUBLIC SCHOOLs 4 (1976).
9. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
10. Id. § 407(a), 78 Stat. at 248 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1976)).
11. Id. § 902, 78 Stat. at 266-67 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (1976)).
12. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973-1973dd (1976 & West Supp. 1983)).
13. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (requiring modification
of "freedom of choice" desegregation plan initiated in 1965 since it had failed to lead to any integra-
tion); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (rejecting "freedom of choice" plan as inade-
quate to eliminate de jure segregation).
14. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 437-38.
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same time that Richard Nixon began his first term as President. I once
heard it said that President Nixon was left holding the remedial Brown
bag. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Green v. County School
Board in 1968, the Justice Department filed a large number of "root-and-
branch" motions throughout the South. In connection with these motions,
the Office of Education (in what was then the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare) often developed total desegregation plans to serve
as proposed court orders. As a result, in Mississippi, for example, some
thirty school districts were scheduled to desegregate fully commencing in
the fall term of 1969. What happened then is familiar history. At the
eleventh hour, federal officials had a change of heart and requested the
district court to delay implementing those desegregation plans. The court
granted that request, but the Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Holmes
County,' promptly reversed.
It was then that effective federal remedial enforcement of Brown really
got under way. To that end, the Nixon Administration introduced several
innovative procedures and programs. First, the Civil Rights Division was
reorganized along subject-matter lines." Since about 1964, it had been
organized geographically. Lawyers working in geographic sections were
expected to handle all types of civil rights enforcement problems, includ-
ing employment discrimination, voting discrimination, police brutality,
and school segregation. Under the reorganization, lawyers were assigned
to work in sections organized according to areas of enforce-
ment-education, employment, or voting. Under this structure, lawyers in
the Education Section could devote their entire time and talents to school
desegregation. I think history will support my conclusion that the reor-
ganization contributed significantly to the effective enforcement of the
Brown decision.
Second, teams made up of high-level officials, lawyers, and staff from
the Departments of Justice and HEW traveled to various key localities to
assist with desegregation. Their basic mission was to meet with state and
local officials, primarily school officials, to discuss the implementation of
desegregation plans. These travelling teams carried an important message:
The Court has ruled; you must desegregate; we will try to help you with
whatever problems you might run into; but we must enforce the law.
Third, there existed a highly structured and extremely effective coordi-
nation between the Departments of Justice and HEW in the development
and implementation of school desegregation plans. A joint committee was
15. 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam).
16. Compare 1965 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 168-69 (reporting that Division had been reorganized
on geographical lines) with 1970 ATT'y GF-N. ANN. REP. 82 (Division organized into sections on basis
of subject matter).
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formed to serve as a kind of federal desegregation coordinating committee
and review board. Unlike many executive-branch committees, this one
really worked-it was not a bureaucratic excuse for nonwork. The com-
mittee met regularly and frequently. Every federally developed desegrega-
tion plan had to be reviewed and approved by this committee. Staff mem-
bers intimately familiar with the local school districts involved and
equipped with charts, street maps, bus routes, and financial information,
would make detailed presentations of alternative desegregation plans to
the committee. After careful analysis and review, and sometimes with
amendments and modifications, the committee would approve the desegre-
gation plan before it.
In addition, the Justice Department initiated what was commonly
called "statewide" school desegregation litigation. The approach was
sparked by the determination to desegregate "at once," coupled with the
need to conserve resources. In Georgia alone, for example, more than one
hundred individual school districts remained out of compliance with
Brown. The traditional approach would have required the preparation
and filing of more than one hundred lawsuits in Georgia alone. Under a
conventional Title IV approach, the Attorney General would have needed
complaints from aggrieved persons in each school district. The break-
through came with the simple yet creative recognition that, since the state
board of education was an active participant in maintaining segregation in
each district, an individual complaint from district X was also a complaint
against the state board. Once the state board was properly before the
court, it could be required to do a constitutional cleaning of its entire
house.17 In large part because of the statewide approach, more districts
were desegregated during the early 1970's than during any other period
following Brown.
What is so remarkable about this structure is that every federally devel-
oped desegregation plan had the support of the entire federal executive
branch from top to bottom-from the White House on down. The review
process ensured that the executive branch was satisfied that a plan met
constitutional requirements and that its implementation was feasible. One
might ask whether the federal government, either before or since, has sim-
ilarly spoken with one voice in this area.
These positive programs may surprise those people who observed Mr.
Nixon's public opposition to busing to achieve racial balance. But there
was no real inconsistency. The approach might be characterized as fol-
lows: "We respect the courts. We may not always agree with them, but it
17. The statewide approach was eventually used in several states, including Texas, Georgia, Ar-
kansas, Mississippi, and South Carolina.
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is our job to implement their decisions. We will try to do so in the least
disruptive way."
In his comprehensive statement on school desegregation, President
Nixon stated:
It will be the purpose of this administration to carry out the law
fully and fairly ....
I have instructed the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, and other appropriate officials of the Gov-
ernment to be guided by these basic principles and policies:
• ..Deliberate racial segregation of pupils by official action is un-
lawful, wherever it exists. In the words of the Supreme Court, it
must be eliminated "root and branch"-and it must be eliminated at
once.
18
In that same statement, the President promised to ask Congress for $1.5
billion to "give substance" to his commitment to desegregation: "Words
often ring empty without deeds. In government, words can ring even emp-
tier without dollars."1
In May 1970, about two months later, the head of the Civil Rights
Division told the press: "I think everyone realizes the law is going to be
enforced. This is it."20 These were not empty words. The federal drive
saw virtually total desegregation of the public schools in the eleven south-
ern states by the fall term of 1970.
Mr. Nixon publicly opposed massive transportation of school children.
Yet his statement reflected a realistic recognition that dual school systems
could not be made unitary without busing students. His position on bus-
ing drew heavily upon the distinction between "de jure" and "de facto"
segregation. The Constitution required "root and branch" remedies, in-
cluding busing, for de jure segregation. The Constitution did not require
such remedies for de facto segregation, surely not busing to achieve racial
balance. As to the former, he would enforce the law vigorously; with the
latter, he would urge restraint.
Although enforcing Green and Alexander was a difficult and complex
task for enforcement officials, the courts, and school boards, the moral
simplicities of the issue mobilized the nation to act. That action carried
over into remedies for de facto segregation as well until the movement for
desegregation slowed down in an atmosphere of doubt and rethinking.
18. Desegregation of American Elementary and Secondary Schools: Statement by the President
Setting Forth Administration Policies, 6 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 424, 434 (Mar. 24, 1970).
19. Id. at 436.
20. Wash. Post, May 30, 1970, at Al, col. 4.
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III.
History, perhaps with the help of political forces, has tended to dim
recognition of the effects of de jure segregation. We thus find, for exam-
ple, the current Justice Department urging in 1982 the abandonment of
busing in Nashville 21-a school system which has been in litigation for
twenty-nine years and which, the courts have held, falls on the de jure
side of the enforcement line.22 Today, one senses in Washington the emer-
gence of an unspoken doubt about Brown's premise that separateness is
inherently unequal. One might ask whether there is a growing subscrip-
tion to an unwritten amendment to a familiar principle: "The amount of
affirmative action, such as busing, required to overcome the effects of past
discrimination is inversely related to the length of time which has elapsed
since Brown."
21. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Metropolitan
County Bd. of Educ. v. Kelley, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983).
22. For a history of the Nashville school desegregation litigation, see Kelley v. Metropolitan
County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 167-78 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). The law of Tennessee had
explicitly required the segregation of schools from 1901 until 1955, when, in response to the filing of
Kelley, the state statute was declared void. Id. at 168 n.1.
